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Abstract 
In this paper, the monetary-financial implications of two versions of Libra are analysed, i.e. 
Libra 1.0 and Libra 2.0. First, I briefly discuss how technological developments in monetary 
history have reshaped the payments landscape and how Libra is going to challenge the 
current bank-based ecosystem. Second, I identify some risks stemming from the current 
monetary-financial system and I review the Euro Area’s regulatory framework to control 
these risks. Third, I assess how a wide acceptability of Libra`s 1.0 and 2.0 could challenge 
the current monetary-financial structure and therefore the risks associated. Finally, I propose 
a Synthetic CBDC issuance, i.e., a narrow banking approach, to limit the new risk associated 
with the introduction of Libra 2.0. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of both money and means of payment has been, and will always be, closely 
linked to technological developments. Money is defined as an asset that fulfils the three 
functions defined by Jevons (1875)—being a medium of exchange, being a unit of account 
and being a store of value—while a means of payment, due to its reduced money demand, 
only fulfils the first two functions. 
Since humankind began to exchange goods as a result of their excess productions, different 
highly valued goods, e.g. agricultural commodities, cattle and metals, were seen as a valid 
means of payment. This primitive monetary system is known as barter and it was widely 
introduced by the tribes of Mesopotamia (6000 B.C.). However, barter relies on the double 
coincidence of wants. Both of the parties of the exchange have to agree to each sell and buy 
a commodity. Since this has proved to be unfeasible, metals were market-borne as the most 
effective asset to fulfil the functions of medium of exchange and unit of account. 
In the seventh century B.C., with technological advances in metallurgy, minting was invented 
and metals in the form of coins became a widely and accepted means of payment. With the 
demand for coin increasing, this means of payment also fulfilled the store-value function, 
which finally saw them able to be categorized as money. The following innovation was paper 
money, the first financial asset—it was a claim on bank metal assets—became widely used 
as a means of payment. Although it was not introduced in Europe until the colonialism era, 
Kublai Khan, grandson of Genghis Khan and first emperor of the Yuan dynasty, 
implemented paper money in China in 1260. In the wake of the passing of the 1844 Peel’s 
Bank Act, in which loan-driven cash creation by commercial banks was banned in UK, bank 
deposits settled through bills of exchange became the most demanded form of money. These 
bank deposits were both an account-based and a financial-asset means of payment since the 
bank has the obligation to redeem the cash or coins upon demand and at face value. The 
widespread use of bank deposits as money and as a means of payment occurred alongside 
the advent of the digital methods of register and settlement in mid-sixties (Hernández de 
Cos, 2020), which marked the beginning of digital account-based means of payment. 
Nowadays, digital technologies are much more refined than those of the past, changing not 
only societies but also the global economy (Schwab, 2017). Since the advent of the digital 
currencies era, non-bank private institutions have entered the payments landscape. E-money 
issuances, e.g. PayPal, Trasnferwise, Alibaba and WeChat, first took place in 1990 and aimed 
to offer faster, more cost-effective and more user-friendly payment systems than the bank-
based ecosystems could. E-money issuances are an account-based means of payment. They 
represent a claim for the user, since the issuer has the obligation to exchange, upon demand 
and at a face value, the e-money issuances for bank deposits. In 2008, with the creation of 
Bitcoin, a new DLT-based and anonymous means of payment was established (Bech and 
Garratt, 2017). Since then, more than 5,000 virtual currencies have been launched with cash-
anonymity as their main design feature. The original idea of digital cash was introduced three 
decades ago by D. Chaum. He proposed a new kind of cryptography that would allow an 
automated payment system and the execution of untraceable payments (Chaum, 1983). The 
last financial innovation is Facebook’s digital currency. In 2019, the Libra Association, led 
by Facebook, put forward a particular digital currency issuance with the same design features 
as stablecoins and with the potential of becoming a widely accepted means of payments due 
to Facebook’s large customer base. Unlike virtual-currencies, stablecoins are backed with a 
pool of assets and could be a claim for the user. 
As a result of this monetary evolution in modern economies, people may demand five 
different means of payment including central bank money, bank deposits, e-money, virtual 
currencies and stablecoins. Central bank money can be classified as cash or central bank 
digital currencies (CBDC). Bank deposits, named b-money by Adrian and Mancini-Griffoli 
(2019), feature a redemption guarantee that is backed by the Estate. On the other hand, e-
money is a claim that can be exchanged for currency at face value (Adrian and Mancini-
Griffoli, 2019). 
 
The EU’s regulatory framework summarises these means of payment into three main 
categories (see Figure 1). The first category are funds, which comprises cash, bank deposits 
and e-money (European Union, 2000). These means of payment are either issued or 
guaranteed by a public authority and, therefore, have a sovereign fiat value, i.e. they are 
denominated in sovereign units of account (USD, EUR, JPY, CHY…). The second category 
are virtual currencies, which are neither issued nor guaranteed by public authorities and, 
therefore, have their own fiat-value, i.e. they are denominated in their own-private unit of 
account (BTC, ETH, etc.) and are not attached to a legally established currency. Finally, the 
last means of payment are stablecoins (Bullmann, et. al., 2019), which are also neither issued 
nor guaranteed by public authorities and, therefore, have their own fiat-value, i.e. they are 
denominated in their own-private unit of account (≋LBR, TUSD, etc.), but are attached to 
a legally established currency. Means of payment denominated in sovereign units of 
account—cash, bank deposits and e-money—generally have a stronger demand and, hence, 
could be considered to be money. Virtual currencies and stablecoins, however, due to their 
weaker money demand, fail to fulfil, so far, the store-of-value function. 
 
In many nations, cash usage for payments has decreased over the last decade. The adoption 
of retail payment innovations and the use of digital currencies suggest an evolution toward a 
cashless society. The emergence of new digital currencies—e-money, virtual currencies and 
stablecoins—as a substitution for cash and bank deposits, may alter the bank-based 
ecosystem and disrupt the monetary policy mechanism and the financial stability. As Carstens 
(2019, p.2) argues, "technological innovations have continually reshaped the monetary 
system, either by changing the nature of money or the workings of the payment system". 
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin do not fulfil some of the money functions successfully 
since their value is not stable (quite high volatility) and their user network is not sufficiently 
large. In fact, they are often treated as speculative assets rather than as money (Claeys et al, 
2018). In contrast, the creation of Facebook’s digital currency could fulfil all the previous 
features and significantly disrupt the bank-based ecosystem.  Facebook has seen an 
opportunity to launch its digital currencies in this context of cash disappearing and non-bank 
universal services. Governments, regulators and international organisations are worried 
about how to monitor a digital currency that could be available to more than 2.5 billion users 
(total number of monthly active users in 2019). In Europe, Facebook has 394 million users 
and Adachi et al. (2020) estimates that Libra Reserve’s total assets under management could 
range from €152.7 billion in the “means of payment” scenario, to around €3 trillion if the 
currency becomes a widely adopted store of value. 
  
Figure 1. EU’s regulatory framework classification 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
In this paper, it is studied the monetary-financial implications of the Facebook’s Libra 
proposal. In section 2, some risks stemming from the current monetary-financial system are 
identified. Section 3 and 4 focus on how a wide-acceptability scenario of Libra’s 1.0 and 2.0 
could challenge the current bank-based ecosystem and therefore the risks associated. The 
following section proposes a regulatory respond to the Facebook’s Libra proposal: (i) a non-
grating license approach for issuance the Libra 1.0; and (ii) grant a license to operate as an e-
money institution issuing Libras 2.0, subject to fully back these issuances with central bank 
reserves, i.e. a Synthetic Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) issuance or a narrow 
banking model. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. THE CURRENT RISKS POSED BY THE EURO AREA’S MONETARY SYSTEM AND ITS 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
Since the advent of the digital-account-based means of payment, i.e. digital currencies, 
monetary systems include two main elements: (i) the infrastructures through which funds are 
transferred between user’s accounts, i.e. the payment systems; and (ii) the means of payment 
themselves. Adequate functioning of the monetary system is a key issue in today’s market-
based economies and, to ensure this, public authorities must identify and control the risks 
posed both for the users and for the economy as a whole. 
 
Any means of payment inherently has two risks: fiat-value2 risk and operational risk. Fiat-
value risk (I) could be defined as a reduction in the value of the unit of account held by the 
user arising from the following two causes: (i) a materialisation of the currency substitution 
risk stemming from a reduction in money demand both domestically and from abroad, which 
triggers long-term periods of currency depreciation and high inflation; and (ii) an over-
issuance of money, which would trigger an excess-aggregate-demand scenario and, hence, 
high inflation. The operational risk (II) could be defined as the risk of suffering losses 
resulting from inadequate designs and ICT failures in the payment systems. Any digital-
account-based means of payment has one or multiple ledgers that digitally record the users’ 
accounts, and one or several infrastructures to move funds between users. These 
infrastructures can be conventional-based, such as the market-based deferred-net-
settlement networks, e.g. Visa Europe; the public real-time gross-settlement networks, e.g. 
TARGET2; and the parallel e-money networks, e.g. PayPal and Alibaba. The 
                                                          
2 Fiat money, also known as fiduciary money, is a mean of payment that does not have an intrinsic value. All 
account-based means of payments lack an intrinsic value because they are an intangible accounting entry in a 
ledger convertible into another fiat-value asset, cash. 
Means of payment
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infrastructures can also be DLT-based, in which participants jointly take part in updating 
the central ledger—as is the case with Bitcoin, some CBDC proposals (Auer & Böhme, 
2020), and the Libra proposal.  
 
Additionally, debt-like means of payment such as bank deposits, e-money and some 
stablecoins also have credit risk (III), which is defined as the possibility of suffering losses 
stemming from the issuer’s failure to redeem its sight obligations. Debt-like or claim 
issuances could be either fractional backed, in which commercial bank’s assets are mainly 
comprised by long-term debt and loans, and semi-fractional backed, in which e-money 
institution’s assets are comprised by short-term debt and cash equivalents.  
 
EA’s monetary-regulatory framework aims at ensuring that households’ and companies’ 
access to a low-risk, efficient and cost-effective means of payment in the current bank-based 
ecosystem. This regulatory approach is based on four key elements: (i) a monetary policy to 
mitigate the fiat-value risk; (ii) a payment system oversight to control the operational risk; 
(iii) a microprudential and deposit-insurance framework to limit the credit risk on a 
microeconomic basis; and (iv) a macroprudential, deposit insurance and lender of last resort 
(LOLR) framework to mitigate the risks—risks of systemic bank runs and risk of economic 
and financial bubbles—for the economy on a macroeconomic basis. 
 
The primary objective of the ECB’s monetary policy is to maintain price stability, i.e. the fiat 
value of the unit of account, which is defined as an inflation rate below, but close to, 2% 
over the medium term. In order to fulfil this objective, the ECB takes a two-pillar 
approach— and economic and monetary analysis—to implement the Eurosystem's 
instruments, which are the open market operations, standing facilities, minimum-reserve 
requirements and asset purchase programmes. 
 
One of the ECB tasks is to promote the smooth operation of payment systems, as established 
by the TFEU. In performing this task, the Eurosystem both operates the real-time gross 
settlement (RTGS) system for the euro—TARGET2—and oversees the market-based 
deferred-net-settlement networks—also known as wholesale interbank clearinghouses—
such as MasterCard or Visa Europe. 
 
The ECB also has a role to promote the stability of the financial system, as assumed by the 
TFUE. Nowadays, the most demanded form of money is bank deposits—a debt-like 
fractional-backed mean of payment. This means of payment—which a priori should have 
credit risk due to its fractional-backed reserve—is guaranteed by public authorities up to 
100.000 EUR and, hence, is generally considered to be a credit-risk free means of payment. 
This configuration of the monetary-financial system, also called fractional reserve banking, 
poses the following risks to the economy as a whole: (i) a risk of systemic bank runs due to 
the fractional reserve; and (ii) a risk of economic and financial bubbles due to the commercial 
banks’ ability to overshoot the economy by creating new money in the process of bank 
lending (Turner, 2015). 
 
On a microeconomic basis, the credit risk of bank deposits is controlled by the UE’s 
prudential regulatory framework—the so-called Basel III—and by the deposit insurance 
schemes. The Basel III framework is based on a microprudential-three-pillar approach, 
which aims at minimising the commercial banks’ probability of default. Pillar 1 aims at: (i) 
converging minimum risks stemming from the assets side of the commercial banks’ balance 
sheets, through a capital ratio, a liquidity ratio and large-exposures limits; and (ii) containing 
system-wide build-ups of leverage through a leverage ratio. Within Pillar 2, a commercial 
bank (i) performs an internal capital and liquidity auto-evaluation process; and public 
authorities (ii) supervise these banks and require additional capital requirements based on 
different risks. In Pillar 3, the financial market disciplines commercial banks through the 
publication of recurrent reports. Finally, the resolution framework avoids bankruptcy once 
the ECB determines that a commercial bank is failing or likely to fail. 
 
Deposit Insurance Schemes are state owned reserves, mainly comprised of public debt, 
which guarantees deposits in commercial banks up to 100.000 EUR. However, these 
reserves only cover 0.8% of total deposits. If a risk of a systemic bank-run materialises due 
to a full migration from bank deposits to cash, in order to comply with the guarantee of 
bank deposits, public authorities should either (i) recapitalise the banking system or (ii) act 
as a LOLR through the central bank, which would disintermediate the commercial banking 
system. On a macroeconomic basis, apart from the abovementioned instruments to control 
systemic bank-run risks, public authorities also have macroprudential instruments, such as 
the countercyclical buffer and loan-to-value caps, to limit over-indebtedness processes that 
can trigger economic and financial bubbles. 
 
Electronic money institutions’ issuances pose a credit risk as e-money is a debt-like and semi-
fractional-backed means of payment and, hence, its reserve is comprised of short-term high-
liquidly securities and interbank loans. For this reason, the EU’s prudential regulatory 
framework of the e-money institutions is primarily based on two pillars: (i) a minimum 
requirement of safeguarding the funds that have been received in exchange for electronic 
money issued and a capital ratio; and (ii) a prudential supervision of these two requirements. 
This considerably limits the credit risk of e-money. 
 
3. THE LIBRA 1.0: A MULTI-CURRENCY STABLECOIN ISSUANCE 
 
In June 2019, Facebook—in partnership with some important companies in payments, 
technology and venture capital, such as Visa and Uber Technologies among others— 
announced that they were planning to create their own digital currency, called “Libra” (Libra, 
2019). In this first white paper, Libra was designed as a stablecoin with the following 
arrangements: (i) its fiat value is designed to be denominated in its own unit of account 
(≋LBR); (ii) its issuances would be semi-fractional backed by a reserve mainly denominated 
in USD; and (iii) it wouldn’t be guaranteed redeemable upon demand at face value. In the 
words of Facebook, “the reserve is established to help instill trust in this new currency and 
gain widespread adoption during its infancy”. According to Fatás and Weder di Mauro 
(2019), this feature of Libra makes it quite similar to a currency board. Apart from the 
economic features, Libra 1.0 is designed as a DTL-based payment system that would allow 
the movement of Libra between users’ accounts.  
 
This first proposal has faced a myriad of critics from both the academic and the policymaking 
world. This stablecoin issuance could challenge the monetary sovereignty not only of 
countries with weak currencies but also that of reserve currency countries (G7 Working 
Group on Stablecoins, 2019). Moreover, it is not clear whether regulators can ensure privacy 
standards and guarantee both consumer protection and legal payments (Niepelt, 2019). 
Williamson (2019) goes further and argues that Libra evades regulation because it does not 
have a difference with coin offerings. Even though Libra would provide large network 
externalities, it also raises privacy and crime issues, and concerns regarding possible 
inappropriate use of data. In fact, the whole transaction data would be monopolised by the 
Libra Association (Fatás and Weder di Mauro, 2019). 
 
Nearly one year after the first Libra announcement, and in response to regulatory authorities’ 
concerns stemming from this particular digital currency design, Facebook published a second 
paper with a new design for the Libra (Libra Association, 2020). In fact, in this second white 
paper, Facebook introduced two versions of the Libra: a multi-currency approach (Libra 1.0) 
and a single-currency approach (Libra 2.0). Libra 2.0 offers the same approach as in the first 
white paper but is guaranteed redeemable upon demand at face value and offers a 
commitment to perpetually maintaining a reserve comprised of short-term public debt and 
cash equivalents denominated in reserve currencies units of account. 
 
These design features make Libra 1.0 a stablecoin and, hence, ensures that it falls outside the 
current EU’s regulatory framework. Whether Libra will become a global digital currency or 
not matters from a policy-making perspective. If UE’s authorities grant Facebook a license 
to issue Libra 1.0, a risk of currency substitution could materialise and the EA’s monetary 
sovereignty could be jeopardised. Given the composition of the Libra’s reserve, by acquiring 
Libras 1.0, people indirectly demand a basket of short-term debt and cash equivalents 
denominated in: 50% USD, 18% EUR, 11% GBP, etc. For the Eurozone, this implies that 
a shift from EUR-denominated bank deposits to Libra 1.0 would indirectly be a demand on 
USD-denominated assets. With households and companies holding ≋LBR-denominated 
means of payment both domestically and abroad, commercial banks will increase their assets 
and liabilities in foreign currency and will have no need to borrow liquidity from their central 
bank, meaning that there will be no transmission of monetary policy via reserves. This 
process is shown in Figure 2. The weakened currency could lead to: (i) a reduction in the 
country's ability to import in its own currency, which could result in public debt problems 
stemming from the issuance of foreign-denominated public debt, and to (ii) long-term 
periods of high inflation and currency depreciation (Calvo & Végh, 1992). 
 
Figure 2: Transmission of monetary policy via reserves 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
This rapid shift in money demand, which would see Libra 1.0 replace bank deposits, would 
be driven in the EU by technological features, such as a user-friendly interface and rapid and 
cost-effective transactions. However, in EMEs, this shift would also be driven by economic 
features such as a more reliable fiat value, which could fully materialise a risk of currency 
substitution. As a global currency outside the control of monetary authorities, Libra also 
poses financial stability concerns. Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2019) emphasise that Libra 
may be subject to important runs on less-liquid or illiquid assets. Depending on the use of 
Libra worldwide, it could trigger a global bank run in times of distress, resulting in unknown 
consequences.  
 
From the user’s perspective, the fiat value of Libra 1.0 would depend on: (i) the sovereign 
denomination of the assets in the reserve, and (ii) the Libra’s commitment to fulfil the 
convertibility at par. In this sense, the main drawback is that users would be subject to a 
disproportionate exchange rate risk (Niepelt, 2019). As it would not provide completely 
stable purchasing power, people will not be able to perfectly smooth their consumption. This 
is especially relevant as ordinary people and companies make most of their purchases in 
domestic currency. In countries with weaker currencies, this could be beneficial.  
 
4. THE LIBRA 2.0: A SINGLE-CURRENCY E-MONEY ISSUANCE 
 
As mentioned above, in the second white paper, Facebook put forward a single-currency 
stablecoin arrangement. Libra 2.0 maintains the same DLT-based payment system and has 
the following economic features: (i) its fiat value is designed to be denominated in sovereign 
units of account—in the case of the EA, the EUR; (ii) its reserve would be semi-fractional 
backed by EUR-denominated short-term public debt and cash equivalents; and (iii) the Libra 
2.0 issuances would be redeemable upon demand at face value, so end users would have a 
claim on Facebook. These design features make Libra 2.0 fall under the EU’s E-money 
framework, meaning that Libra 2.0 would be considered to be an e-money issuance. 
 
Due to Facebook’s large customer base in UE, EUR-denominated Libra 2.0 could be a 
widely and rapidly adopted means of payment. If UE’s authorities allow Facebook to issue 
Libra 2.0, the associated risks, both for users and for the EA’s economy, would change. From 
the users’ perspective, as with any other e-money issuance, Libra 2.0 would have a fiat-value 
risk, operational risk and credit risk. The fiat-value risk would be the same as cash and bank 
deposits since it stems from the sovereign unit of account (EUR). Regarding operational risk, 
Libra 2.0 would develop a new type of payment system, DLT-based infrastructures with new 
ITC risks, which would be supervised by the ECB and the NCBs. The credit risk for users 
would depend on the asset side. Facebook put forward a reserve comprised by A+ short-
term public debt (80%) and cash equivalents (20%) denominated in EUR. If a bank-run on 
Libra 2.0 takes place, the high liquidity composition of the reserve allows Facebook to 
effectively redeem its sight obligations. 
 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the risks would also depend on reserves. A migration 
from bank deposits to Libra 2.0 would trigger three main risks to the current EA’s monetary-
financial infrastructure: a risk of structural bank disintermediation, a risk of systemic bank-
runs and a risk of sovereign-debt-market fragmentation. 
 
The risk of structural bank desintermediation (I) consists of the shrinking of the commercial 
banks’ balance sheets due to non-bank financial institutions investing client funds in money 
markets, including the interbank market. As is shown in Figure 2, a migration from bank 
deposits to Libra 2.0 implies that Facebook should invest the new funds collected in short-
term A+ public debt (80%), purchasing it from the commercial banks, and in wholesale 
deposits (20%) in commercial banks. This reduces the commercial banks’ balance sheet by 
the amount sold and banks also replace retail deposits by wholesale deposits, which are a 
less-stable and more expensive funding. This would also widen the structural liquidity deficit 
of the banking system, which could materialise a risk of systemic bank runs (II).  
 
Figure 3. The impact in the commercial bank’s balance sheet of a migration from 
bank deposits to e-money 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
Hernández de Cos (2019) and Adrian and Mancini-Griffoli (2019) considered different 
scenarios in which e-money could replace bank deposits and, hence, trigger different levels 
of structural bank disintermediation. The worst-case scenario for commercial banks would 
be a full-disintermediated commercial banking system, where fractional banking and, 
hence, money creation would be significantly limited. The Chinese commercial banking 
system has experienced, for several years, a significant level of bank disintermediation due 
to its main e-money issuers, Alibaba and Tencent (BIS, 2019). These BigTechs have played 
an important role in the interbank market operating as Money Market Funds (MMFs), since 
their liabilities are substitutes for bank deposits and these deposits were invested in the 
interbank market, both on a collateralised and non-collateralised basis.  
 
The last risk for the economy as a whole is the risk of sovereign-debt-market fragmentation 
(III). As 80% of Facebook’s reserve would be comprised by A+ public debt issuances, some 
EA-country’s issuances under that rate—e.g. Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece—would 
become less in demand, which would increase the risk premium of those countries. 
 
5. A SYNTHETIC CBDC PROPOSAL: THE DIGITAL EURO 
 
In this section, I set out a monetary-financial regulatory response to Facebook’s two digital 
currency proposals. Regarding Libra 1.0, I do not recommend the authorisation of these 
issuances within EA’s jurisdiction. As it was mentioned in section 3, any migration from 
EUR-denominated bank deposits to Libra 1.0 would imply an indirect USD demand and, 
hence, a depreciation of the EUR. In accordance with the EU’s free movement of capital, 
any person could replace their EUR-denominated assets with USD-denominated assets. The 
EUR may lose its power as an international reserve and could experience a higher level of 
volatility. This currency substitution would only be justified due to a loss of trust in the EA’s 
monetary-financial system, not because of technological feature—as would be the case with 
Libra 1.0. As for Libra 2.0, I recommend the authorisation of these issuances in EA’s 
jurisdiction, subject to the following three changes to the EU’s regulatory framework. First, 
in order to limit operational risk, EU’s public authorities should reinforce and adapt the 
oversight framework to a new DLT-based payment system. Second, concurring with the 
issuing of the second Libra white paper, the Financial Stability Board issued new 
comprehensive guidelines on the regulatory approach for global stablecoins, which I 
assimilate to a reinforcement of the e-money regulatory framework (FSB, 2020). The 
guidelines cover prudential, competitive, resolution, AML and market discipline regulation, 
which are fields that should be reinforced due to Libra’s systemic asset reserve. 
 
Finally, in order to limit credit risk to the user and limit risk of structural bank 
disintermediation, risk of systemic bank runs and risk of sovereign-debt-market 
fragmentation to the economy as a whole, the ECB should grant Facebook access to its 
balance sheet in order to establish a 100% CBDC-backed reserve. This would imply a 
synthetic CBDC issuance and the configuration of Facebook as a Narrow Bank. In Figure 3, 
I show how a migration from bank deposits to CBDC—although it still materialises a risk of 
structural bank disintermediation—reduces the risk of systemic bank runs by eliminating the 
interlinkages between bank and non-bank financial institutions and fully mitigates the risk of 
sovereign-debt-market fragmentation. 
 
Figure 4: E-money institutions establishing a 100%-CBDC reserve.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
This 100%-CBDC reform relating to e-money issuers was implemented by the PBoC during 
a two-year period, from 2017 to 2019. This reform required e-money BigTechs in China, e.g. 
Alibaba and WeChat, to gradually establish a 100%-CBDC reserve. The main aim of this 
reform was to limit the risk of structural bank disintermediation stemming from 
interlinkages between banks and these e-money providers (BIS, 2019). Moreover, in its 
second white paper, Facebook introduced a Libra 2.0 100%-backed by CBDC in order to 
save the costs of managing the reserve. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
With the announcement of Libra in the first White Paper, it was thought that Facebook’s 
stablecoin would become a global digital currency that would rule all private 
cryptocurrencies. After that announcement, Facebook changed its plan and has designed 
Libra 2.0 to please public authorities.  
 
Nevertheless, Libra 2.0 poses several risks to Euro Area monetary-financial structure. Due 
to Facebook’s large customer base in UE, EUR-denominated Libra 2.0 could be a widely 
adopted means of payment. It would derive risks of structural bank disintermediation, risks 
of systemic bank-runs and risks of sovereign-debt-market fragmentation. At the same time, 
e-money issuance presents three types of risks from the users’ perspective: a fiat-value risk, 
operational risk and credit risk. 
 
These drawbacks of Libra may be minimized configurating Facebook as a Narrow Bank, and 
allowing it to create a Synthetic CBDC. So as to do that, the ECB may grant Facebook access 
to its balance sheet in order to establish a 100% CBDC-backed reserve. 
 
In the meantime, the regulatory framework of the European Union must be strengthened. 
Uncertainty about the rule of law should be avoided and all legal vacuums regarding 
stablecoins and private digital currencies removed.  
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